What I've learned about the Kashmir Issue™
The Modi administration’s
unilateral move to scrap Articles 370 and 35A (which afforded special
privileges and relative self-autonomy to the state) has widened the
conversation on the Kashmir IssueTM. It’s a contentious move; viewed
as the dilution of the ideological, political and legal basis of Jammu and
Kashmir’s existence, an attack on Kashmiri identity. If we are to develop some
semblance of an opinion amidst the barrage
of contradictory accounts, one must go to the very beginning of the Kashmir’s
relationship with India and examine the ever-present desire for
self-determination against the way Article 370 shaped and was shaped by the
political landscape.
According to UN International Law,
a people’s right to self-determination – the right to determine one’s political
destiny – sits alongside the state’s claim to territorial integrity. Territorial
integrity actually takes precedence, presumably to protect the nation-state
from unravelling into smaller factions driven by tribalistic loyalties.
However, if a people are deemed colonised then they possess the right of
self-determination, a right to be independent of the illegitimate governing
body. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the azaadi (freedom) movement rests
on whether Kashmiri people are being colonised by the Indian state. It demands
the examination of the grounds on which several
voices have been labelling India as colonising Kashmir.
As per the Instrument
of Accession, signed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, the region is a
territory of India. Furthermore, the Kashmiri Constituent Assembly went as far
as to declare itself as “an
integral part of India” within Article 3 of its constitution. Since the
region is not outside the borders of the Indian state and jurisdiction, it’s
incorrect to consider it colonised by India.
There has
been a mislabelling of the tyranny of militarisation as colonisation,
especially since the military presence has been exhaustive and riddled with
human rights violations and a lack of accountability. The Kashmir region has
been subject to extensive military occupation – it is one of the most
militarised places in the world – by India. At least two generations have only
known the extensive military presence. Multiple international human rights
bodies have critiqued
the operations of the State under Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and the
lack of accountability for abuses of power.
However, digging
deeper reveals a complicated picture of the militarisation. It came into
existence in the late 1980s, in response to the rise in insurgency that is
directly linked to the forced displacement of Kashmiri Pandits and other
minorities in the region. Furthermore, the occupation has been justified by ever-present
Pakistani meddling in the region, bearing in mind that there have been
three Indo-Pakistani wars fought involving Kashmir. Liberation of Kashmiris has
remained the ruse for Pakistan’s decades-long meddling. The disillusionment
with the India drove Kashmiris towards Pakistan, where they were provided with equipment
and training to conduct an armed struggle.
One cannot condone
military action simply because it began as a response to internal and external
threats to the state. To become blindly accepting of retaliatory military action
to threats is to allow nationalism to go unchecked, often placing people’s
lives and civil liberties as collateral. That said, condemning the very
presence of military personnel in Kashmir conveniently ignores the threats
of insurgency and needs of border security. Writing it off as an act of
colonisation is intellectually dishonest and recognising this should not be
considered apathy towards, or acceptance of, the plight
of Kashmiris at the hands of the Indian armed forces.
Having diagnosed
militarisation as at the core of Kashmiri resistance to India, it begs the
question: if the misdemeanours of the Indian state are the motivation for azaadi,
would condemnation and subsequent reformation of the government’s conduct be a
solution for Kashmiri grievances? Arguably, the revocation of Article 370 actually
opens up the path to reinstatement
of the political rights, as understood within the framework of the Indian
federal system.
But the
Kashmir IssueTM is not a mere three decades old, and neither is Kashmiri
resistance – crucially tied to Article 370 – which has defined the
post-partition Kashmiri political landscape. For the purpose of understanding
the desire for freedom we must begin at 1947, when Kashmir began as a part –
but always somewhat apart – of India.
Upon the
request of Kashmir representatives, Article
370 was created, which limited the jurisdiction of the state to matters of
communications, ancillary, defence and external affairs. The granting of
special privileges to Kashmir alone was a complex political lubricant during
turbulent nation-uniting times; an attempt to reconcile the fundamentally
different aims of Kashmir (independence) and the centre (integration and access
to the geo-strategically
important land). Crucially, it was supposed to be temporary measure,
prompting Kashmir to transition into adopting the Indian federal constitution.
But Article
370 – not having been removed in a timely manner – has remained a point of
contention, rather than reconciliation, and the political landscape of Kashmir
over the last 70+ years informs us of the continual souring of relations and
diverging of aims.
In a bid to
hasten integration, the Indian state impaired democratic functioning in
Kashmir. Article
370 was hollowed out by upholding dummy political classes, utilising them
to engage in coercive centralisation and curbing non-violent means of
expressing dissent. Kashmir’s political classes have been guilty of being
complicit with the Indian government. Of course, as the more powerful body, the
Indian government must shoulder much of the blame. The most notable instance of
the state’s interference and the local government’s complicity is the 1987 Election in
Kashmir, recognised as rigged.
The more
Article 370 was hollowed out by the India due to their prioritisation of integration,
the more strongly Kashmiris clung to it as part of their identity. The
acceptance of this conflation of Article
370 and Kashmiri identity has only served as fodder for identity politics.
It has prevented us from asking the question of why Kashmiris require an
elevated status and set of privileges distinct from other states, when the
constitutional federalism affords uniqueness to Indian states anyway. The
manner in which it was diluted over the years has caused Kashmiris to develop a
strange dichotomic lens – the ‘give us privilege or you’re a tyrant!’ view –
when what they are rightfully owed by the Indian state is a reinstating of
democratic process and freedom from the state’s abuses of power.
Having
understood all this, one has to address what took place on the 5th
of August. Opinion on the constitutionality of the move remains
split;
a testament to the unchartered territory the Indian government finds themselves
in. Given the manner in which the mishandling of Article 370 has caused it to
be utilised as a device to fuel claim of self-determination, its removal is a
potentially useful manoeuvre to put Kashmir on the path to eventual statehood.
However, it is only when more Indians are critical of the blatantly
Hindu-nationalist aims of the Modi administration – instead of blindly approving and curbing
voices of dissent – will there be some hope of ensuring that justice is
delivered to the Kashmiris.
For, if the
claim is with India, then so is the blame – and responsibility to do right by
the Kashmiri people.
